Regardless of a pleasant few months this summer time after Burak, notorious slayer of the Lightning Community, dropped his proposal for the brand new second layer protocol Ark the place individuals had a number of dialogue round totally different covenant proposals, drivechains are as soon as once more turning into a dominant subject of dialogue. There are numerous issues with drivechains, from the rationale for supporting them, to claims about how they do not have an effect on incentives being inaccurate, and even causes for why they might really harm miner earnings as a substitute of accelerating it. On this piece I will focus solely on the problems relating to incentives for brevity’s sake.
In case you are not accustomed to the particular technical workings of BIPs 300 and 301, you may learn a succinct abstract of that right here.
Separation of Considerations: Mainchain Miners and Sidechain “Miners”
One of many core claims from drivechain proponents is that the activation of this BIP introduces no new necessities or prices for miners who take part in securing these sidechains. Whereas that is strictly technically true, it doesn’t require or mandate something new from miners, the incentives of the design naturally create a funnel motivating miners to tackle full accountability for operation of those sidechains themselves to maximise revenue. Over time as a result of aggressive nature of mining, this could finally make miners working sidechain nodes and dealing with block development themselves to keep up their financial competitiveness.
The design of blind merge mining (BMM) in BIP 301 specifies a mechanism for customers who don’t have interaction in Bitcoin mining to brazenly bid within the mempool for miners to pick their sidechain block for affirmation. For miners to just accept a particular bid from some sidechain “miner” they have to embrace an identical dedication to choosing their block of their coinbase transaction. The consensus guidelines of the proposal make any bid transactions from sidechain miners invalid except the corresponding message is included within the coinbase. This each ensures that miners can’t declare funds from a sidechain miner except they really affirm their sidechain block. It additionally prevents them from claiming funds from a number of sidechain miners whereas solely commiting to certainly one of their sidechain blocks.
The proposal is designed this fashion with the objective of permitting miners to gather income from sidechains with out having to really validate them or contain themselves in developing blocks for the sidechains. In line with proponents, sidechain miners will merely bid the charges paid to mainchain miners as much as be virtually the whole thing of the sidechain’s income, and miners will seize ~99% of the worth with out having to do something. This assertion fully glosses over the truth and nuances of the incentives concerned on this association.
It’s often claimed that “anybody can take part in developing sidechain blocks.” This isn’t true. Whereas it’s an open course of to take part in, it is not free. It requires capital within the type of bitcoin to really be a sidechain miner, and this capital requirement grows in proportion to the expansion in payment income generated by a particular sidechain. So if a sidechain generates solely 0.0001 BTC per block, it is going to be a really open course of that just about anybody can take part in. However to illustrate that sidechain generates 1 BTC in charges every block, that may be a very totally different sport. Additionally, the withdrawal interval for a drivechain is three months; that is roughly 90 days earlier than you may really withdraw something you might have earned, so at 1 BTC per block with 144 blocks in a day as much as 12,960 BTC are required to pay miners for confirming sidechain blocks. Take into account in principle it is a aggressive factor, in order that value will probably be cut up between all of the profitable sidechain miners, however that’s nonetheless a large quantity of capital (only for one sidechain). Even a extra modest 0.1 BTC continues to be 1,296 BTC in that interval.
This brings me to the crux of the issue. Do you actually suppose that almost all of the charges collected on a sidechain are going to be paid to miners? Individuals will collectively half with and put in danger over 1200 BTC in a 3 month interval simply to have a shot at incomes a bit of 12 BTC? Your complete rationale for miners by no means having to do something is that ~99% of accessible income will probably be given to miners resulting from aggressive pressures, and it’ll not be definitely worth the 1% reward to mine the sidechain’s themselves. That 12 BTC represents the 1% left over. Over 1200 BTC is in danger for the potential reward of 12 BTC. If that assumption is incorrect, and sidechain miners that aren’t additionally mainchain miners is not going to spend that quantity of capital for that low of a return, then there’s a a lot greater % that mainchain miners aren’t capturing on the desk. The one option to seize it in that state of affairs will probably be to turn out to be a sidechain miner themselves too. Miner’s complete incentive is to maximise revenue, leaving important revenue on the desk will inspire them to seize it. And here is the ultimate kicker: miners need not have and spend that BTC capital up entrance with the intention to mine the sidechain, they simply have to stay a dedication to a sidechain block of their coinbase. For the miners themselves that is free.
The idea of how a lot of the charges will probably be paid to mainchain miners being incorrect basically creates an incentive spiral that results in the very same sort of mining centralization stress conventional merge mining or one thing like a blocksize enhance would create. In different phrases, it means the declare about BMM fixing mining centralization is fake.
Second Layer Payment Sniping
One of many sport theoretical considerations with Bitcoin long run is a matter known as payment sniping. Publish block subsidy when most of miners’ income comes from charges, when irregular payment spikes happen, miners really do have an incentive to carry out quick reorg assaults and battle over blocks that accumulate these abnormally excessive charges. Proper now if an enormous payment spike happens miners can at all times rely on the block subsidy within the subsequent block even when they missed out on that payment spike. As that subsidy disappears and miners rely on the variance of the payment market alone to pay the payments, exaggerated sufficient spikes in charges change the equation and make it value reorging (or redoing work) for a time to battle over that exaggerated earnings. It will make sense till the price of redoing work on the identical block again and again with no reward collected approaches the purpose of being an financial loss, after which miners would rationally stop the battle.
The best way that drivechains BMM specification works adjustments the dynamic of this. In conventional merge mining you would need to reorg the mainchain with the intention to reorg a sidechain. In drivechains you do not. The identical approach that mainchain blocks have a pointer again to the earlier block, drivechains do as nicely. The factor is, you do not have to take away a dedication to a sidechain block with the intention to level to a special one. Have a look at this instance beneath, the numbers in parentheses are the blocks the present one is pointing again to:
A sidechain block when utilizing drivechains is simply one thing dedicated to within the mainchain, and whereas the mainchain goes marching ahead with out going again, the sidechain can commute between a number of forks. The sidechain software program continues to be following a longest chain rule (which miners are trusted to respect), however not like the mainchain reorgs these blocks do not simply disappear. The dedication to them nonetheless exists within the mainchain, and nonetheless must be scanned.
So what does this must do with payment sniping? All the things. For miners to payment snipe on a sidechain it does not require redoing work, it does not require giving up the mainchain charges (and even charges from different sidechains). So when that sidechain miner collects twice the charges as regular and solely pays the mainchain miners what they usually do, a mainchain miner can come alongside and reorg that block on the sidechain and accumulate the sidechain charges whereas the miner who obtained cash on chain for the unique model of that sidechain block nonetheless retains that payment. So the unique sidechain miner earns nothing, and loses what they paid in mainchain charges. So one miner can feesnipe with out the primary miner dropping what they earned. If a miner will get fortunate, the identical miner may even double accumulate the unique payment on the mainchain and the sidechain charges by reorging it in the event that they mine two blocks in a row. Solely the sidechain miner who does not mine on the mainchain loses cash on this state of affairs, and since they don’t even have hashrate there’s nothing they will do about it.
Now to ensure that the mainchain miner to efficiently pull this off, the sidechain miners must construct on their block as a substitute of the unique. If a pool is large enough, they’ve respectable odds of simply discovering the subsequent block themselves, the place after all they may construct on their very own block. They might even brazenly bid like a sidechain-only miner to extend their odds. This might require paying an precise mainchain payment, however the preliminary reorg was free. Different miners would possibly even simply construct on the reorg block as a substitute of the unique as a result of it’s newer, these particulars come all the way down to how the precise software program implementation swimming pools deploy is constructed.
General although there’s a massive asymmetry in threat between sidechain-only miners and mainchain miners relating to sidechain reorgs. Mainchain miners who’ve a sidechain block reorged from them endure the chance value of dropping additional potential income, sidechain-only miners really lose cash they already had. And all of this happens with no reorg disruption to the mainchain itself. It is a massive drawback, and disincentive, for sidechain-only miners to take part on this course of.
Even eradicating sidechain-only miners from the image, this dynamic change nonetheless exists in a state of affairs with solely mainchain miners. If we take a look at mainchain miners doing this to one another although, the truth is it should probably fall into equilibrium the place everybody is not reaching optimum income, however better than they might with out sidechains. Some would possibly query whether or not that may prevail provided that 26% of miners can cease all pegout transactions from sidechains, and that the tail finish of swimming pools would possibly achieve this in protest of disproportionate advantages for bigger swimming pools. All that may accomplish is to create an natural incentive for almost all of miners who stand to achieve from the withdrawal going by way of to orphan the mainchain blocks of the miners stalling it. So whereas this nonetheless disproportionately advantages bigger swimming pools who will statistically discover a number of blocks in a row extra usually, smaller swimming pools have an incentive to just accept it. This dynamic is one more centralizing stress for miners by itself, and in addition one more reason the incentives push the association in direction of miners validating and mining these sidechains themselves.
MEV
Miner Extractable Worth is turning into an enormous downside, significantly within the ETH ecosystem. MEV is any sort of methodology to revenue the place the miners/stakers/and so forth. have an uneven benefit over everybody else in gathering that revenue. Usually that is achieved by way of controlling the order of transactions in a block, corresponding to trades interacting with a DEX contract, however in summary that’s not strictly obligatory. The revenue margin that sidechain-only miners maintain for themselves mentioned above is itself a really primary type of MEV, it’s worth sitting on the desk that miners have a bonus in having the ability to declare. This type of MEV just isn’t very difficult, costly to investigate, and is well extractable by mainchain miners merely working primary sidechain software program.
Let us take a look at a transaction ordering type of MEV, like a DEX on ETH. Decentralized Alternate protocols permit non-custodial buying and selling of property between buying and selling events utilizing a wise contract as a mediator. It atomically fulfills each side of the commerce, or none. The factor is although, if you can also make a revenue in making such a commerce, the one option to accumulate it’s if miners embrace that transaction in a block. And the easy truth of broadcasting that transaction provides miners the within scoop on accessible revenue earlier than it is really confirmed in a block. This offers them the chance to entrance run you and accumulate these income for themselves. A sidechain-only miner participating in such actions would probably be capable of bid a lot greater than different sidechain miners, getting a lot nearer to 100% of the payment rewards straight accessible in that block. Nonetheless, in doing in order that they sign to mainchain miners that a chance for even better revenue exists. On condition that F2Pool is at the moment enjoying MEV video games entrance working different Stacks contributors, Luxor bought and is constructing out Ordinalshub, miners seeking to generate new streams of income is a truth of actuality and never a hypothetical. That is one more incentive for miners to turn out to be sidechain miners themselves.
However the MEV threat does not cease there with simply extra miner centralization threat. There are conditions the place miners can’t simply simply seize the MEV worth themselves. Say an organization or group ran a entrance finish for a large DEX to make it simpler to make use of (virtually each DEX on ETH has such gamers), and sourced the consumer orders earlier than they even hit the mempool and privately constructed a block to bid for to mainchain miners. Mainchain miners would not be capable of examine the contents of this block till after it was confirmed and propagated between sidechain nodes, so they are going to be incapable of frontrunning within the mempool to extract this worth, they must really reorg and feesnipe the sidechain. This clearly would harm the sidechain miner working the DEX entrance finish and the mainchain miner will be double paid, however the mainchain miner can by no means really extract this worth himself entrance working the mempool as a result of the dear transactions by no means enter it. And by reorging and placing the sidechain miner/DEX entrance finish operator out of enterprise, they’re destroying that supply of worth. That is a extra concerned effort, and extra divergent from their foremost enterprise of simply working nodes, or selectively changing issues they see of their mempool.
There are additionally conditions the place mainchain miners extracting MEV is basically unattainable. Think about a sidechain spun up particularly to facilitate funds for items on Amazon, or combine with some Amazon cloud service. The oblique new income this sidechain’s existence might generate is actually solely capturable by Amazon. For miners to extract that worth, they might actually must construct an organization that may out of date and change Amazon. That is simply not occurring.
So in the long run not solely do MEV dangers on drivechains exacerbate incentives for mainchain miners to straight take part in them, it additionally has the opportunity of introducing exterior affect into mining incentives. What if Amazon solely shared its MEV worth with the few greatest swimming pools? It could incentivize miners to change to them to earn a minimize. It provides them a level of direct affect over miners income streams.
However Merge Mining Already Exists
That is the widespread response to those considerations: merge mining already exists. Sure, it does, however for freely valued shitcoins. Namecoin is the widespread instance introduced up, however Namecoin represents basically nothing in proportion phrases of miners earnings. Quite a few SHA256 cash have been merge mined with Bitcoin, virtually none of them are anymore as a result of their worth crashed to the purpose of it not being definitely worth the effort. That’s the empirical historic development right here. These techniques observably don’t pose wherever close to the identical incentive threat as a coin pegged to Bitcoin, that can’t merely independently crash in worth to the purpose that it isn’t value involving your self with.
Some individuals would possibly deliver up federations, however the actuality is nobody appears to have curiosity in utilizing federated sidechain pegs. They generate no demand, the place there appears to be loads of clambering for a drivechain hashrate escrow peg. That would basically alter the equation right here and create demand massive sufficient to trigger damaging incentive distortions the place they in any other case would not exist. On the opposite aspect, mining swimming pools establishing a federation would supply no actual dynamic membership to who controls the cash (as the present keyholders must explicitly add new members and switch cash), and features no actual worth from being merge mined. It’s also one thing mining swimming pools that begin it might run independently of precise miners, i.e. if 100% of hashrate left mining swimming pools that began a federation, the swimming pools with no hashrate might nonetheless function it. They might signal blocks, and any prior merge mined scheme is basically meaningless as a result of the swimming pools management the cash on chain. It is basically only a federation like Liquid that has some phantasm of an overlap with mining at that time.
So, the massive claims relating to drivechains are that mainchain miners don’t have to care about them, and that they don’t alter mining incentives in any approach. I’ve laid out the largest (however under no circumstances all) of the arguments displaying they do actually alter them in very substantial methods. These prices must be one thing severely thought of when considering this proposal, as regardless of the declare by many drivechain advocates, they’re very actual.
