Shinobi’s Strawman is a weekly collection the place our Technical Editor Shinobi challenges the Bitcoin neighborhood, aiming to fire up dialog round heated technical debates.
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We’re going to attempt one thing of an experiment as we speak.
Drivechains are being proclaimed by some because the savior of Bitcoin, the reply to all of its issues. It solves the long run safety finances, permits full freedom to include new options into Bitcoin, and presents no downsides for present Bitcoin customers.
Sounds too good to be true? It’s:
1) Drivechains Change Miner IncentivesDrivechains introduce a hodgepodge of recent variables into miners’ incentives, and after introducing that instability advocates push for customers merely adopting a degraded safety mannequin for all new use instances and performance through the use of a sidechain in lieu of fixing the bottom layer. How is that this any totally different than an outright assault on Bitcoin self custody?
2) Present Sidechains Have No AdoptionThere have been many alternative design proposals for sidechains through the years, however the one at present deployed ones are run by federations (Liquid and RSK), each of which have failed to achieve any significant degree of adoption since they have been deployed. Does this imply sidechains usually are not value continued improvement effort? Or are they value it, and the failure of federated chains to be adopted is solely the results of shortcomings in that particular sidechain design?
3) Drivechains Exacerbate The Dangers Of MEV
MEV is one thing that’s doable on Bitcoin already, as programs like Stacks are demonstrating, however at present the types of MEV doable on Bitcoin are both generated by completely impartial altcoins like Stacks (which traditionally have trended to an insignificant share of miners’ earnings, like Namecoin), or very low within the degree of complexity (like frontrunning Inscriptions). Drivechains open the door to arbitrarily advanced types of MEV on sidechains, whereas additionally guaranteeing that the token producing that MEV is pegged to the value of Bitcoin. I.e. it can’t merely fade away to an irrelevant fraction of miner earnings as folks cease shopping for an altcoin. This drastically worsens the dangers and potential injury of MEV on Bitcoin.
4) No, Swap Markets Aren’t An AnswerPaul Sztorc replied to a few of these issues on Twitter, however these responses do probably not tackle the foundation points. Swap markets may sound like a solution, however the actuality is that these simply shove the liquidity necessities onto yet one more occasion, assuming they may present huge quantities of liquidity for nearly nothing in return. Which may work for small scale utility customers, or having liquidity obtainable to arbitrage uncertainty across the peg, I don’t assume it is a foregone conclusion that sufficient liquidity to cowl the “resolution to the safety finances downside” with out slippage is a given, to say nothing of all the opposite customers who would need to swap out and in. He then goes on to disregard the distinction between a mainchain reorg, which requires redoing work and power expenditure, versus a sidechain reorg which doesn’t. Lastly, he equates a random particular person for no logical or revenue pushed cause giving cash away with somebody producing a revenue with an exercise they’re the only real gatekeepers of.
Look, finally, I’m a Bitcoin maximalist. I need what’s greatest for Bitcoin.
I feel drivechains are silly, harmful and a waste of time, however I need to hear your ideas on the topic. Am I fallacious in regards to the factors above? Is there one more reason that I ought to be in opposition to drivechains that I’ve ignored?
Please don’t write to me with some random hopium. I’m open to novel opinions. I need the dialog to progress. Above is my greatest summation – we merely aren’t wherever near a significant consensus on drivechains.
My DMs are open. Opinion@bitcoinmagazine.com. Let’s hash it out.
